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ABSTRACT

hinders efficient markets, as do regulations restricting
trades.

Water use in agriculture depends heavily on the
adoption of efficient irrigation technologies. It is
therefore essential to provide incentives for the
adoption of these technologies in arid regions. In real
world applications, this task is complicated by missing
markets and restrictions on policy tools. Often, property
rights are not well established for water and regulatory
agencies do not have the mandate to set appropriate
prices or fees.
In addition, precision conservation
technologies are information intensive. This feature of
production reduces efficiency through the market
failures associated with the public good properties of
information. However, it also provides regulators with a
new, surprisingly successful policy tool, the provision
of information. This paper uses the public good
properties of information and the nature of precision
irrigation technologies to explain the unanticipated
success of information based program in California and
its relationship to other incentives in encouraging the
adoption of conservation irrigation technologies.

In
addition,
conservation
oriented
irrigation
technologies can be highly information intensive, which
means that information related issues must be
understood for appropriate management. In fact,
adoption incentives based on public weather
information provision in California have demonstrated
an unanticipated level of success. This paper discusses
the factors behind the successes and weaknesses of
information programs and how they are linked to water
pricing in providing incentives for adoption of
conservation irrigation technologies.
MARKETS AND FAILURES
It is important to be aware of the scope and limitations of
real world price incentives as they are manifested in
California since market perversities can lead to
incentives for inefficient water use.
Wholesale agricultural surface water delivery in
California is primarily performed by two agencies, the
California Department of Water Resources (DWR), and
the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR). Both
of these agencies are required to price the water
delivered based on the cost of repaying the bonds
issued to build and operate the conveyance and storage
facilities. This requirement prevents them from charging
the scarcity value of water or from applying fees to
encourage conservation.

INTRODUCTION
In arid regions such as California agricultural,
environmental, and municipal users compete fiercely for
scarce water resources. Approximately 80 percent of
California’s water is supplied to a 20 billion dollar
irrigated agricultural industry (Parker, 1997). If urban
landscaping, golf courses, and parks are included, the
share of water applied by irrigation is even greater, as is
the commercial value of its use.
Since water
consumption depends heavily on the irrigation
technology used, the adoption of water efficient
precision irrigation systems is critical (Khanna &
Zilberman, 1997).

The types of pricing schemes offered reflect the focus
on bond repayment. Often, customers do not even pay
marginal prices for water deliveries, instead having an
annual fixed allocation that they purchase in bulk, which
is based on acreage owned. The power to provide
market-based incentives has another restriction: The
USBR is required to allocate property rights based on
reasonable grower needs, or beneficial use. In this “use
it or lose it” framework, a grower has a disincentive to
adopt conservation technologies since that could result
in proving that the grower has lower water needs and
lead to a reduction in water allocated. Water markets are
impossible under this allocation of property rights since

In the most naive analysis, the incentives necessary to
encourage the appropriate adoption levels are
straightforward: Ensure that water users pay a price for
water that is equal to its true shadow value. Not
surprisingly, the practical situation in California is too
complicated for the direct application of this principal.
Water supply and regulatory agencies are limited in
what fees they can charge. Uncertainty in water rights
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any water the grower has to sell would demonstrate that
grower was getting more water than needed.

successful ongoing markets have been constrained to
be within agricultural sectors with intersectoral trades
restricted to costly, repeated negotiations between
cities, agriculture, and environmentalists for each
individual transaction.

Although there is limited flexibility in USBR policy,
redefinitions have been made in an attempt to reduce the
disincentive for conservation. First, it is now possible to
classify conservation as beneficial use. However, this is
based on mechanistic top down calculations that do not
easily allow for individual innovation and flexibility.
Second, certain water trades can be classified as
beneficial use, allowing the establishment of limited
water markets. Although these redefinitions do move the
water policy of the USBR in the direction of
conservation oriented incentives, they also demonstrate
the restrictive framework that agencies such as the
USBR and DWR must work within.

Daily ongoing water markets operate in the Westlands
agricultural water district.
Another market exists
between agricultural water districts within the San Luis
Delta Mendota Water Authority (Olmstead et al., 1997).
Because these markets function entirely within the same
delivery agencies, and represent entirely agricultural
uses they have been able to circumvent many of the
obstacles that broader markets would face. Of course,
this limits the benefits of the trades. Nevertheless,
almost half of the water used by Westlands district
flows through the market (Olmstead, 1998).

The limitations in USBR pricing policy reflect
California’s long history of uncertainty in water rights.
There have been two competing water rights doctrines,
appropriative and riparian. Claims made under one
system were challenged under the other system, leading
to a century of litigation. In recent years rights have
become relatively well established. The legacy of
uncertainty is still evident, however. In periods of water
scarcity, or when new species are listed as endangered,
the water rights of cities and agriculture are threatened.
In addition, since water trading is a relatively new
phenomenon in California, there is sometimes a public
perception that growers should not have the right to
make “too much” money from selling water, since the
state owned water is supplied to them at delivery cost
by government agencies, and is based on redefinitions
of beneficial use. Perceptions of profiteering can lead to
extensive scrutiny of trades, increasing their costs and
perhaps weakening the water rights of the participants.

USBR sponsored trades to bring water to environmental
uses are being debated in the inter-district water market.
These are politically sensitive, not only for the reasons
already mentioned but also because the funding for
these trades is assessed from the water districts. Some
water districts have demonstrated sentiment that they
should not have to bid against fees already paid to the
USBR when purchasing water. Nevertheless, given
enough time and the continued solidification of water
rights, these barriers to trade may ease.
In the meantime, however, water delivery agencies have
an extremely limited ability to use water prices to
encourage the efficient use of water. Since markets are
limited and costly and agency pricing cannot be set
based on scarcity, these agencies have been forced to
look to other mechanisms to promote conservation.

The politics of solidifying rights drives many of the
positions held by water users in negotiations. Privacy is
highly valued since public outcry can lead to lawsuits
threatening water rights. Supporting water markets can
be viewed as a signal that a stakeholder is obtaining
“more water than they need,” so even if a party stands
to benefit significantly from the market, it may be in that
party's interest to publicly voice reservations about the
market. Similarly, if growers must establish that they
deserve the water allocations that they receive, they may
resist conservation programs that can imply that they
have not been using their water efficiently in the past.

IMPACTS OF A WEATHER INFORMATION
PROGRAM

In an attempt to encourage water conservation in
agriculture given their severe restrictions on pricing
incentives, the DWR instituted the California Irrigation
Management Information System (CIMIS) in 1982. The
CIMIS network consists of 111 weather stations across
the state providing a wide range of weather related
measurements to growers. The principal data product is
daily regional evapotranspiration (ET). Originally, the
information was provided free of cost to subscribers
through dedicated modem lines. University of California
extension supplemented the weather information with
detailed instructions on how to take advantage of the
raw data for irrigation of particular crops. It was hoped

Other restrictions on water trading exist. For example,
trades between different sectors (for example from
agricultural to urban) require special approval, which can
be expensive and take a great deal of time. As a result,
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that growers could reduce water wasted in irrigation if
they had better information on daily impacts of weather
on crop water use.

drip or sprinkler systems in response to the availability
of the CIMIS program.
The report found that it would be difficult to privatize or
charge fees for the CIMIS information. Growers could
share the information almost costlessly. Thus, to a
certain extent the weather information had public good
characteristics. Although private consultants were
providing weather information to growers for a fee, they
were developing value added, individually tailored
products. Because these products were specific to
individual growers, the problem of the costless spread or
pirating of the information was not an issue for a value
added product. An interesting pattern of provision of
public information to private users was noticed. The
CIMIS system was used for the more public component
of the information while individual consultants stepped
in to provide the private part, usually using the CIMIS
system as an initial starting point for their work. The
potential for “pirating” the information was a significant
deterrent preventing privatization of the core weather
product or funding it through fees.

In a tight state budget environment, questions about the
performance of the program led to in inquiry about its
effectiveness. Concerns about the scope of the program
arose because a relatively small group of growers were
the principal users of the system. Irrigation consultants
were also significant users of the system, reselling value
added products to growers. This motivated policy
makers to question if ET provision was an appropriate
role for the government or if the system should be
privatized or fee based. As the system evolved,
newspapers became clients and CIMIS ET data began to
print in the weather section. With this, questions arose
about how to prevent the spread of the information if a
fee were to be charged.
To address these concerns, the University of California
performed a study of the CIMIS system to compare its
costs and benefits in terms of water savings and
production increases. Unanticipated impacts of the
system were also investigated, as was its potential for
privatization or funding through user fees. This study
(Parker et al., 1996) estimated that the CIMIS saved
approximately one hundred thousand acre feet of water
per year in agriculture. These savings were not only for
growers supplied by the DWR, but also for those who
got their water from the USBR or other sources. In
addition, growers using CIMIS reported increased yields
in spite of their water reductions.

Many unanticipated uses were discovered for the
weather information. Growers were finding that they
could use it to increase the quality of their crops, for
example, by optimally stressing wine grapes or
preventing melons from rotting in standing water. The
reductions in standing water were also beneficial for
pest control, reducing pesticide use and associated
costs (Daane et al., 1995). Making use of the entire set
of weather variables, growers were able to predict pest
outbreaks and reduce pesticide applications to those
particular situations.

The intensive users of the system provided most of the
water savings and reaped most of the benefits.
Although this was a relatively small group, the benefits
and water savings they experienced provided
substantial statewide impact. The combined net profits
to growers resulting from the water cost savings and
increased revenues from yields were estimated to be 32
million dollars annually. This was significantly more than
the eight hundred thousand dollar annual budget of the
program.

As Internet use became more widespread, CIMIS
information was made available in that form. Since the
weather information could be used by groups outside of
the jurisdiction of the DWR, these groups were able to
develop methods to take advantage of the system,
providing unanticipated water savings. Much like the
Internet itself, the availability of the weather program
encouraged innovations for unexpected uses as clients
discovered ways in which the system could benefit
them. These users included fire control districts and city
and county planners. Because of the high price of urban
water and high value for the quality of their amenities,
urban landscaping and golf courses were among the
most intensive users of the system and had the highest
rates of water savings and benefits from the system.
Even though these groups were far outside of the
pricing mandate that the DWR had, their water use was
heavily impacted by its information program.

These users tended to face high water costs, have fast
draining soils, and high value crops. Irrigation
technology effected benefits as well. Most of the
intensive users of the program used pressurized
irrigation systems. A minority among the intensive
users, growers with nonpressurized irrigation systems
such as flood and furrow, experienced about a 5 percent
in water savings while growers using drip and sprinkler
systems experienced savings of about 15 percent. In the
interviews many growers reported that they switched to
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Although it is clear how an information system can
provide benefits to unanticipated groups, the reasons
for the other results observed are not necessarily so
evident. This paper proceeds to explain the link between
weather information and agricultural production, why
growers choose to use the program, how is it possible to
simultaneously achieve water savings and yield
increases, and perhaps most importantly, how
information interacts with other incentives.

percent while high precision technologies, such as
computer controlled drip systems, can have efficiencies
of above 90 percent.
These technologies are information intensive. Gains
cannot be realized if the grower does not have
information on the changing daily water requirements of
the crops. Therefore irrigation efficiency is a function of
the information quality, the precision of the application
technology and the heterogeneity of the production
sub-units (Osgood, 1999). Micro unit variability (σ) is a
measure of the heterogeneity of the production subunits. There is locational variability of the dynamic of
depletion of soil moisture and soil capacity to store
water for absorption by the plants. Depletions in soil
moisture are driven by temporal variations in ET, filtered
by the water holding capacity of the soil and crop
properties. High micro unit variability lowers irrigation
efficiency as sub optimal amounts of water are applied
on each micro unit (day). Using weather information and
precision irrigation technologies, a grower can counter
the negative effects of high micro unit variability.
Therefore the benefit of these technologies is highest
when there is a great deal of micro unit variability and
diminishes for those facing low levels of variation.
Because farms have different weather, crop, and soil
characteristics, micro unit variability changes from farm
to farm. The benefits of precision technologies therefore
vary depending on farm characteristics.

ADOPTION, PRECISION, AND INFORMATION
The literature on precision technologies demonstrates
how water use is related to irrigation technology choice
and why efficient irrigation systems require quality
information in order to be effective. In this literature,
waste in irrigation systems arises from growers being
constrained to a uniform application of water when
actual crop water consumption vary from day to day.
Hot windy days dry out crops more than cool moist
days.
To quantify weather effects on water demands, irrigation
engineers use daily evapotranspiration or ET (Snyder et
al., 1981). ET is the volume of water that evaporates
from and transpires through a crop in a day due to that
day's weather. If an inflexible irrigation system prevents
a grower from adjusting to the water demands of
different days, that grower is forced to decide on the
compromise homogenous application level. On days
with low ET, the compromise amount applied is too
much water and the excess deep percolates or drains off
the field to be wasted. On days with a high ET, the
compromise level of application offers too little water,
and the crops dry out, reducing yields. Aggregating
over the growing season, water is less wasted and
potential yields are sacrificed.

Increasing the quality of daily ET information improves
irrigation efficiency yielding an intensive (production
based) effect on water use. Obviously, this effect is
most pronounced for growers who have substantial
micro unit variability and who are using precision
irrigation
systems
(Osgood,
1999).
Because
improvements in daily ET information increase irrigation
efficiency more for high precision systems than for low
precision systems, information improvements make
precision irrigation systems more attractive in terms of
profits from increased yields and water savings. This
provides the extensive effect: It is an incentive for the
adoption of efficient irrigation systems.

A precision irrigation technology addresses this
problem by allowing the grower to tailor water
application to the appropriate amount for each day. In
this way, a precision system can simultaneously improve
water efficiency and increase yields. Caswell and
Zilberman (1986) use the concept of irrigation efficiency
to model this process. In their framework, production (y)

The threshold adoption framework of David (1975)
clearly represents the incentives behind this process.
Assume a population of growers with heterogeneous
levels of micro unit variability, and a choice of upgrading
from a low precision irrigation technology (A 1) to a
higher precision technology (A 2) at a given level of ET
information quality (I). It is worthwhile to invest in the
higher precision technology if its yield and water
savings benefits exceed the investment cost of the

is a function of effective water (x e) which is the water
actually absorbed by the plant, so

y = f (x e). This is in

contrast to the applied water (x ) which is the amount
applied to the field over the growing season. Irrigation
efficiency (α ) is defined as the ratio of effective water to
applied water, or α = x e/x . Low precision technologies,
such as furrow irrigation, have efficiencies of about 60
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technology. Equation 1 represents the adoption
threshold and implicitly determines σ∗ , the threshold
micro unit variability of adoption. At levels of micro unit
variability above the threshold it is worthwhile to invest
in the new technology, while at lower levels it is not
worthwhile to adopt.
[Px yf(αΑ2,Ι,σ∗ x2*) – Px x2*] – [Px yf(αΑ2,Ι,σ∗ x1*) – Px x1*] = C
(1)

The market failures associated with the pirating of
information, prevented private sector from providing
that type of product, leaving the government to fill that
role. From a policy perspective, the ease of spread of
information was found to be an advantage. The more
information “pirating” that occurs, the more successful
the program. Not imposing users fees is optimal from a
social prospective. The wider the spread of the
information, the greater the incentives for conservation.

Adoption is mapped to the population by observing the
distribution of individual micro unit variability, as in
Figure 1. If the solid line illustrates the threshold micro
unit variability at which it is worthwhile to adopt, the
population right of the solid line would adopt while the
population to the left of the line would not. Increasing
the information quality improves the efficiency gain of
higher precision technologies and therefore shifts the
threshold to the left to the dashed line. The integral of
the population density between the two lines represents
the group of new adopters and illustrates the adoption
impact of providing subsidized weather information.

Because there are two market failures, the cost of waste
and public good problems leading to the under
provision of information, market forces will lead to
optimal adoption and use of precision systems only if
the true shadow value of water is faced by growers and
if there are no market failures associated with
information. Thus, even if California growers faced
appropriate prices for water, there would be inefficient
water use from the market failures due to the public good
characteristics of weather information. Therefore there
is a government role in providing growers with weather
information. In addition, Osgood (1999) showed that if
prices did not accurately reflect the scarcity value of
water, an information “super-subsidy” (provision of
weather information exceeding that necessary to
counteract the public good market failures) is an
effective tool to improve conservation.

CONCLUSION
Weather information allows growers to take advantage
of the flexibility of conservation technologies to respond
to changes in water needs over time, saving water on
some days and increasing yields on others. Therefore,
information provides more yield and water savings
benefits to conservation technologies than to lower
precision, less flexible irrigation systems. This causes
conservation technologies to be relatively more
profitable and their adoption worthwhile for a larger
segment of the population.

Figure: 1 Adoption Threshold

This shift can be accomplished through other
incentives. Increasing the marginal price of water or of
the agricultural output leads to improvements in the
profit differential, shifting the threshold micro unit
variability to the left and increasing adoption. Because
the investment cost includes the cost of physical
infrastructure as well as the human capital investment of
learning how to produce using the new system,
adoption can also be influenced by reducing the
learning costs through education and outreach (Wolf &
Nowack, 1994).

The groups that will take advantage of these
technologies will be those who have high value crops
and high water costs resulting in relatively higher
potential profit increases. Because the gains arise from
an ability to adapt water applications to heterogeneous
micro unit demands, growers who face higher variation
due to weather, crop, or soil characteristics are also more
likely to invest in conservation technologies. In
addition, unexpected groups may be affected by the
program. Information programs have a spillover potential
leading to unanticipated benefits and conservation far
beyond the original mandates of regulatory agencies.
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Even with weather information provision, constraints
preventing efficient water markets or scarcity pricing of
water continue to reduce incentives for adoption. In
Parker et al. (1996), it was noted that the biggest
dis incentive for the adoption of precision technologies
was low water prices. However, information programs
increase the responsiveness of growers to react to other
incentives as they evolve, either through gradual policy
change or because of a crisis. Therefore, they provide
an important policy tool to compliment the pricing
mechanisms that are or may become available.
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